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GOOD MEDIA AND QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT 
 
There is a wide spread belief that democracy and good governance thrives on the 
flow of information. The “role of the media” is generally regarded as critical in 
promoting good governance and controlling corruption. In numerous policy propo-
sals and general recommendations from international actors (i.e. the World Bank, 
UN, OECD), the importance of a free press in curbing corruption is being heavily 
emphasized. Economic research on corruption lends empirical support for a strong 
relationship. 
 
Around the globe you find a striking unanimous support of the general idea that the 
mass media has a key role in processes of establishing and maintaining well func-
tioning government institutions. General elections, political scandals, and misuse 
of public funds make great news stories. In theory, a system of independent, com-
petitive and pluralistic media will provide the flow of information needed to upset 
public opinion over wrongdoers among public officials, help voters effectively 
“vote the rascals out” at elections, and initiate and monitor processes of policy 
change or institutional reform that eventually may serve to elevate government in-
stitutional performance. Once the mass media are allowed to operate freely, it will 
serve as a fourth estate within the framework of a prospering liberal democracy. 
 
The research project “Good Media and the Quality of Government” aim to elabo-
rate further the general relationship between transparency (press freedom) and 
Quality of Government (corruption). This paper provide a general overview and 
critical assessment of the theoretical foundations and research findings concerning 
the nature of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. 
 
As the number of studies of the focal relationship amasses, there is now a strong 
need for improved theory and sharper measurements of a wider range of characte-
ristics of the media structure and media system in countries and regions around the 
world. I argue that, in order to make better policy recommendations, we need 
research that can identify more precisely what components of free press that are 
most important in a journey towards good governance. To reach this goal, research 
need to focus on the developing of hypotheses and the search for more and better 
indicators of the subcomponents of the global concept of press freedom. I believe 
that there is still much work to be done collating existing data from studies in mass 
communication research, journalism studies and other sources. This work will pro-
vide media data with better resolution that eventually will enable us to perform mo-
re powerful tests and systematic elaborations of the seemingly strong relationship 
between free press and corruption.  
 
 
PART I: 
THEORY 
 
In contemporary research, there are countless statements that emphasize the im-
portance of mass media in processes of democratization and economic 
development. However, it remains unclear what kind of causal mechanisms that is 
thought to produce the relationship between press freedom and corruption. 
Surprisingly, in most empirical studies, there is little or no theoretical discussion 
about what causal mechanisms are operational. Rather, most researchers seem pre-
occupied with problems of data and estimation. At this stage, the global concept of 
press freedom is too broad to be fruitful in a more detailed analysis. We simply do 
not know much about what subcomponents of “free press” are more important than 
others at what stage of development. And even worse, we still lack well founded 
hypotheses about what forces that drive the relationship or condition the strong 
effects of free press on corruption. 
 
Clearly, most research on free press and corruption is dominated by economics, 
both theoretically and methodologically. One important underlying assumption is 
that availability of information is a crucial determinant of the efficiency of econo-
mic markets. Analogous assumptions are being made about political markets. For 
instance, citizens require information to become knowledgeable and make in-
telligent voting choices. Supposedly, the free media serve as the intermediaries that 
collect information and make it available to citizens. 
 
As noted by other observers (Lindstedt and Naurin 2008), the standard point of 
departure in many analyses is an application of a principal-agent model to the 
problem of corruption and underdevelopment. In this case, the principal are 
typically citizens/voters and the agent are politicians/bureaucrats.1 The origins of 
corruption can be traced back to an information asymmetry where the agent have 
an information advantage over the principal. In short, this asymmetry can be 
overcome with more system transparency – often defined as the amount of in-
formation and accessibility of information. 
 
Citizens’ general accessibility to information is the heart of all principal agent mo-
dels: Theoretically, a free press will serve to improve citizen’s accessibility to 
information which in turn will make it more difficult for politicians and public 
servants to cover up or get away with corrupt behavior (Lindstedt 2006). The same 
reasoning backs up the idea to fight corruption through the mechanisms of 
electoral accountability: well informed voters can effectively vote corrupt officials 
out of office (Beasley and Prat 2001). The implicit assumptions become a matter of 
probabilities: The freer the press the higher the probability that the mechanisms of 
electoral accountability will curb corruption. A precondition is of course that free 
and fair democratic elections actually take place. 
 
From my perspective, the principal-agent models are far too holistic and too 
general to be of any practical use in future research. The main causal mechanism – 
that free media automatically will provide citizens with information relevant for 
monitoring public officials – is too simplistic. There are just so many things that 
may go wrong in this suggested process. There are too many intervening variables 
that must be explored. And a causal chain can never be stronger than its weakest 
link.  
 
Given what we know from countless evaluations of media coverage of elections in 
established democracies (see fc Asp 2006), the assumption of a direct relationship 
between free press and a well functioning electoral democracy seems naïve. Not 
even in established democracies the collective free press can automatically or 
regularly fulfill the normative requirements of impartiality and neutrality. The 
                                                   
1 “Corruption ordinarily refers to the use of public office for private gains, where an official 
(the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some 
sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal” 
(Bardhan 1997).  
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performance of media actors also vary between actors. And far from all reporting 
provide citizens with information that is useful for evaluating government 
performance or is helpful for holding office holders accountable (Esaiasson and 
Håkansson 2002). 
 
Coyne and Leeson 
Free media is also often presumed to be a catalyst of economic development. 
According to Coyne & Leeson, media is a key institutional mechanism for 
achieving a successful policy mix that promotes economic development (Coyne 
and Leeson 2004). In their words, media can turn potential games of conflict into 
games of coordination, making it possible for countries to escape from a trap of 
underdevelopment, non-cooperative behavior, and unhealthy institutions. But how? 
The standard way of reasoning is that an effective media lowers the cost of infor-
mation in a society that makes it possible to overcome the asymmetry of informa-
tion between the principal (citizens) and the agent (government). The underlying 
mechanism seems to be, again, that the more information that is accessible and can 
be distributed to the citizens by the media, the easier it gets to coordinate efforts in 
developing societies.  
 
Coyne and Leeson convincingly illustrate that mass media can make a difference. 
In their case studies of the transitions of eastern European states they identify i) 
countries where the media has positively affected a successful economic develop-
ment (Poland and Hungary), ii) countries that illustrate unsuccessful attempts and 
where lack of a free press is isolated as important explanation (Ukraine) and iii) 
countries where media can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient mechanism for 
overcoming a reformers dilemma (Bulgaria). 
 
Macdonell and Pesic 
There are of course numerous ways in which mass media potentially can make a 
difference in curbing corruption. The dual role of mass media is to raise public 
awareness about corruption and investigate and report incidents of corruption. In a 
research anthology published by the World Bank, Rod Macdonell and Milica Pesic 
(2006) identify eight ways that the media can directly affect the incidence of cor-
ruption: exposing corrupt officials, prompting investigations by authorities, expo-
sing commercial wrongdoing, reinforceing the work of anti-corruption offices, pro-
viding a check on anti-corruption offices, promoting accountability at the polls, 
pressuring for change to laws and regulations, and encourageing officials to avoid 
adverse publicity. Similar lists, accompanied by illustrative narratives from around 
the world can be found also in other World Bank publications (Stapenhurst 2000).  
 
However, there are no systematic data on the overall performance of the free press: 
At what frequency and regularity are media actors in different countries actually 
performing all these good deeds of flooding citizens with relevant information? 
What is the actual capacity for free media actors to engage in corruption-curbing 
activities of this sort? 
 
In addition to subcomponents of standard free press indicators (degree of pluralism, 
independence and competitiveness), additional media variables measured at a 
higher resolution should also be included in our models if we want to learn more 
about what media institutional settings or environments that impacts good 
governance in general and corruption levels specifically. 
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Tentatively, and following Kleinstuber (2004), the projects aim is to identify and 
empirically evaluate potentially important subcomponents of free press indicators 
at three different levels: a) the system level (macro), b) organisation level (interme-
diate), and c) the content/output level (micro). The goal is to be able to uncover the 
supposedly large variation (and explanatory power) in media system variables, and 
to measure intervening variables that help explain why there are so strong 
relationship between free press and corruption. 
 
The system level (a) covers the global and national media system – laws and regu-
lations, the degree of commercialization and centralization, the ownership structure 
(Djankov et al. 2003), the relationships between mass media elites and other elites, 
the degree of citizens’ media dependency of political communication and the 
press/television ratio in citizens’ consumption, the quantity of partisan media, and 
the status of public service media .  
 
The organisational level (b) covers the policies of single media actors, the training 
of journalists and journalists’ democratic beliefs and role conception, and the 
editorial dependency of sources.  
 
The content/output level (c) covers the quality, quantity and diffusion of the actual 
media content. The actual extent of investigative journalism, the content of media 
coverage of election campaigns. 
  
 
PART II: 
OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS IN PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
In recent comparative analyses of the general relationship between media and 
quality of government (QoG), the intuitive impression of the potential importance 
of the media – that “free press is bad news for corruption” – has been strongly sup-
ported. Common indicators such as the degree of free press (Brunetti and Weder 
2003; Chowdhury 2004; Norris 2004) and the level of news paper circulation 
(Adserà et al. 2003) show strong and robust direct effects on levels of corruption, 
also with alternative measurements and when other important explanatory variables 
are being accounted for. There also seem to be a general agreement on the main 
direction of causality in the literature: that a freer press generate lower corruption 
and not the other way around (Ahrend 2002). 
 
In the literature, there are some good examples of inspiring elaborations of the 
focal relationship that I believe will advance our knowledge and even help us make 
better policy recommendations. 
 
Lindstedt and Naurin 
Catharina Lindstedts and Daniel Naurins study of the relationship between 
transparency and corruption is an illustration of how a more elaborate analysis can 
qualify our knowledge substantially (Lindstedt and Naurin 2008). Their claim, 
which is substantiated by empirical results, is that just making information 
available will not prevent corruption unless there are favourable conditions already 
in place for publicity and accountability, i.e. media circulation, free and fair 
elections, and an educated electorate.  
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Lindstedt and Naurin also attempts to develop the oversimplified principal-agent 
model. They argue that we cannot take for granted (as economists seem to do) that 
transparent information about the agent will always reach the principal no matter 
how available or accessible the information is. Economists have failed to ack-
nowledge that there are costs involved in obtaining information. Lack of demand, 
lack of mediators and citizens’ lack of capabilities to process the information can 
hinder a development towards good governance. The authors conclude that 
“increasing the chances of publicity and accountability strengthens the power of 
transparency to reduce corruption”. 
 
Ahrend 
Another study that demonstrate the necessity of estimating interaction effects in 
explanatory models of corruption is Rudiger Ahrends (2002) study of the impact of 
human capital (education) on corruption. His analyses show that the nature of the 
relationship depends on the monitoring capacities of the civil society (press 
freedom). Only in countries where press freedom is well developed there is a 
positive effect of education on corruption. But in countries where civil monitoring 
(press freedom) is low, education increases corruption. This is another example of 
elaboration that lead to improved or nuanced policy recommendations, in this case 
that it may be counterproductive to initiate efforts to improve schooling and educa-
tion in countries that score low on press freedom.  
 
Freille, Haque and Kneller 
In the most elaborate and complete analysis of the focal relationship between free 
press and corruption (Freille et al. 2005), authors also arrive at the same general 
conclusion about the effects of free press on corruption using a large time-series 
cross-section regression analysis in combination with an EBA-analysis (Error 
Bounds Analysis). The results evidence a close relationship between press freedom 
and bureaucratic corruption, thus confirming the findings of earlier research. In 
their models they control for wide set of variables found consistently related to 
corruption in previous empirical studies (see fc Treisman 2000).   
 
The Freille, Haque and Kneller study also confirm that analyses of  subcomponents 
of inclusive press freedom indices is a fruitful enterprise in pushing the research 
forward. Interestingly, their analyses reveal that the subcomponent laws and 
regulations of the popular Freedom House press freedom index (see description 
below) fail to qualify as robust, while the two other subcomponents – political and 
economic pressures on the press – prove to be robust to changes in model 
specification. In other words, the results suggests that it is the political environment 
and economical environment (in that order), and not laws and regulations, that is 
driving the strong relationship between press freedom and corruption.2 Authors 
conclude that the improvements in certain categories of press freedom thus can 
have an important impact on corruption. Reducing political influence on the media 
may be the most effective way to reduce corruption levels (Freille et al. 2005).   
 
 
PART III 
                                                   
2 The primary reason for the loss of significance of the laws and regulations subcomponent 
of the FH Press Freedom index can be traced back to three variables: proportion of protes-
tants, a dummy for scandinavian legal system, and a dummy for party list system. When 
these variables enter the analyses, the effects of laws and regulation are reduced. 
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OVERVIEW OF EXISTING DATA 
 
Surprisingly, in contemporary research into mass communication and journalism, 
comparative studies with large-n designs are still quite rare. In most cases, more 
in-depth comparisons of mass media (journalists, media structure, etc) include only 
a handful of countries. However, recently published articles within economic 
research show that new data collection efforts may prove to be quite fruitful.  
 
The two most accessible sources of data on Freedom of the Press come from the 
Freedom House (FH) and Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF). Most of the empirical 
studies of the relationship between free press and corruption has been using these 
sources. Below, I will briefly introduce these two data sources. 
 
The FH Press Freedom index is made up of 23 evaluative indicators of press 
freedom trying to tap the “degree to which each country permits the free flow of 
information”. The indicators focus on the preconditions of press freedom and cover 
three categories: 1) the legal environment, i.e. basic descriptions of the laws and 
regulations that could influence media content and the media’s ability to operate 
freely; 2) the political environment, i.e. the degree of political control over the 
content of news media, official censorship and self-sensorship, and whether 
journalists are subject to harassment or punishment from the state or other actors;  
and 3) the economic environment, covering the overall economic situation in the 
country, the structure, transparency and concentration of media ownership, and the 
impact of corruption and bribary on media content.  
 
The Press Freedom index vary from 0 (Most Free) to 100 (Least Free). The 
evaluations are based on compilations from a large number of sources such as 
correspondents overseas, staff and consultant travel, international visitors, and 
representatives from other global organizations. Numerical data available for the 
period 1994-2006 (print and broadcast). In 2002 the index covered 193 countries 
and ranged from 8 (Iceland) to 96 (North Corea).1 The FH Press Freedom index is 
made up by three subcomponents (legal (0-30), political (0-40) and economical 
environment (0-30)). The subcomponents are highly intercorrelated, correlations 
ranging from r=.64-.95) (Freille et al. 2005). All subcomponents of the FH index 
will soon be a part of the standard QoG data set. However, Freedom House is un-
fortunately very reluctant to release detailed information of the single indicators 
used for constructing the FH index (no free flow of information there). 
 
The RSF Press Freedom index is based on a compilation of 50 indicators of press 
freedom violations collected with a questionnaire to correspondents, journalists, 
researchers, jurists and human rights activists. Most of the indicators are the actual 
number of journalists that was murdered, tortured, kidnapped, disappeared, 
imprisoned, put under surveillance or sacked. There are also indicators of the 
existence of state monopolies, opposition news media, and controlled access to 
journalist professions. In 2002 the index covered 135 countries and ranged from 
0,5 (Finland) to 97,5 (North Corea).  
 
The rank correlation between the RSF “press freedom violations”-index and the 
FH broader-in-scope “press freedom preconditions”-index in 2002 is high 
(rho=.89), indicating that the indices produce very similar ranking of countries. 
However, the linear correlation is lower (r=.81) because of a slightly curvilinear 
relationship (see figure 1): RSF discriminate more than FH for countries with 
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poorly developed press freedom. At the same time, the disagreement between the 
two indices is also higher at the upper end. For example, in Nepal, violations of 
press freedom (RSF) are higher than what we would expect from Nepal’s score on 
the FH index.  
 
The general indices of press freedom is not without criticism. Shelton Gunaratne 
(2002) identify three shortcomings with existing measurements of press freedom. 
1) Firstly, they emphasize on the nation state as if each state were independent of 
the outside world. He argues that a press freedom index is incomplete and 
inaccurate without factoring in citizen’s ability to access exogenous media. In an 
era of globalization, the “flow of information” does not stop at countries’ borders. 
2) Secondly, the indices still cover mainly two traditional endogenous media: print 
and broadcasting. New sources of information such as the Internet still weigh light-
ly into the measures. 3) Thirdly, all indices assume that press freedom is primarily 
freedom from government incursion, although one may assume that commercial, 
institutional and other interests are vital in constructing a more accurate index of 
press freedom.  
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Figure 1 The relationship between FH Press Freedom Index and RSF Press Freedom index. 
 
In conclusion, to be able to heed Gunaratnes call for better instruments of press 
freedom, we need to get access to the subcomponents of existing index, and 
complement existing media data with data from other sources. As indicated earlier, 
in the economic literature, press freedom indicators is being used as a proxy 
variable for citizens’ accessibility of information. By collating more media data, I 
believe that we can construct far better measures of the “quantities and qualities” 
of the information that are actually available to (and in fact also processed by) 
citizens in a given country. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
I agree with Samarth Vaidya (2005) that most of the economics literature has taken 
a naïve and non-critical view of the media’s role in curbing corruption. I believe 
that the relationship between government and the media is far more complex than 
any principal-agent model can account for. The presumptions that free press 
automatically will set all good things in motion is simply to good to be true. 
Taking the actual content of information into account, Vaidya concludes that 
“media’s ability to deter corruption in governance is far from unequivocal once we 
allow for settlement possibilities, contestable evidence, and false allegations” 
(Vaidya 2005).  
 
I believe that corruption can also thrive from a “flow of information”. Also in 
countries with advanced press freedom, I can think of many ways in which 
information in the media can be flawed, skewed, insufficient or simply irrelevant 
to citizens when evaluating government performance. In such cases, the informa-
tion will be worthless to citizens who wish to monitor public officials or hold re-
presentatives accountable at elections.  
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